A multi-case integration across the coffee, forestry and textile sectors by Turcotte, Marie-France et al.
DOI 10.1515/bap-2012-0016      Business and Politics 2013; aop
Marie-France Turcotte*, Juliane Reinecke and Frank den Hond
Explaining variation in the multiplicity of 
private social and environmental regulation: 
a multi-case integration across the coffee, 
forestry and textile sectors
Abstract: Amid concerns for a regulatory void in transnational fields, the prin-
ciple of private regulation has become institutionalized. Many sectors have seen 
the emergence of multiple and overlapping standards. When comparing the 
sectors, there is considerable variation in standard multiplicity. We build on three 
institutional perspectives that have been put forward to explain the emergence of 
sustainability standards – the economic, idealist and political-institutional per-
spectives – to analyze the phenomenon of standard multiplicity. Each perspective 
reflects a different kind of action logic and is simultaneously present and acces-
sible to various parties involved. Based on a cross-sector analysis of standards 
multiplicity in the forestry, coffee and textile sectors, this article seeks to make 
two contributions. First, whereas these three perspectives have been presented as 
competing, we propose that they are complementary in offering partial explana-
tions for different episodes in the dynamics underlying standards multiplicity in 
different sectors. Second, whereas most studies have analyzed standard setting 
in single sectors and thus have understood it as being an intra-sector phenom-
enon, our cross-sector analysis of the dynamics of standard setting suggests that 
it is propelled by both sector-specific contingencies and experiences as well as by 
the experiences from other sectors.
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1  Introduction
Amid concerns for a regulatory void in transnational fields, the principle of 
private regulation has become institutionalized over the last decade. However, 
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the precise form of these regulations has been left to debate and experimentation. 
As a result, a number of overlapping local and transnational standard setting 
experiments have emerged to address the social and environmental issues in 
various sectors.1 Some of these “sustainability” standards are generic in pro-
viding broadly defined guidelines for responsible behavior (e.g., the UN Global 
Compact) or standardized yet evolving frameworks for non-financial reporting 
(e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative). Most of them are sector specific and focus 
on particular issues, such as labor and worker rights, fair trade, protection of the 
natural environment, and good governance. Many sectors have seen the emer-
gence of multiple standards that address the same issues, such as the forestry, 
textile and coffee sectors.2 When comparing them, it becomes clear that there is 
considerable variation in standard multiplicity. In some, there is continued frag-
mentation, such as in textile, whereas in other sectors attempts at consolidation 
and coordination have been more effective, such as in coffee and forestry. Despite 
similar starting positions, private regulation has had starkly divergent outcomes 
across different sectors. Rather than constituting a unified attempt to govern 
transnational arenas, the privatization of regulation in these and other sectors is 
characterized by both differentiation and integration.
The multiplicity of social and environmental standards begs important ques-
tions about the evolution of private governance. How might we understand, then, 
that various sectors diverge in how private regulation through standard setting 
has taken shape? In this paper, we build on three different institutional per-
spectives that have been put forward to explain the emergence of “sustainabil-
ity” standards: economic, idealist, and political institutionalism. We use these 
perspectives to analyze the phenomenon of multiple standards in three sectors 
– forestry, coffee and textile – to find that they illustrate different trajectories: 
continued fragmentation in textile, emerging cooperation in coffee, and consoli-
dation in forestry. By analyzing their dynamics, we seek to explain the variations 
in standards multiplicity.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Next, we characterize three 
institutional perspectives that have been used to analyze standard setting. Then, 
we recount the dynamics of standard setting in the coffee, forestry and textile 
sectors. The analyses are based on previously published studies and materials. 
On the base thereof, we show how similar starting points resulted in different 
dynamics and outcomes. We seek to explain variations in the multiplicity of 
standards through the lenses of economic-institutional, idealist-institutional, and 
political-institutional perspectives. We conclude by making two contributions. 
1 Vogel (2008); Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010).
2 Fransen (2011); Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen (2012).
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First, whereas these three perspectives have been presented as competing, we 
propose that they are complementary in offering partial explanations for dif-
ferent episodes in the dynamics underlying standards multiplicity in different 
sectors. Second, whereas most studies have analyzed standard setting in single 
sectors and thus have understood it as being an intra-sector phenomenon, our 
cross-sector analysis of the dynamics of standard setting suggest that it is pro-
pelled by both sector-specific contingencies and experiences as well as by the 
experiences from other sectors.
2   Triple certified? Competing theoretical  
perspectives on standards multiplicity
Social and environmental standards have been defined as a set of “voluntary pre-
defined rules, procedures, and methods to systematically assess, measure, audit 
and/or communicate the social and environmental behavior and/or performance 
of firms.”3 Their aim is to have firms internalize social and environmental exter-
nalities, such as unsafe working conditions or environmental pollution, often in 
a transnational setting.4 They are a form of private regulation based on the codi-
fication of particular standards that are often complemented by the monitoring 
of how well these standards are effectuated and also, on occasion, by a certifi-
cation scheme that asserts compliance. Adherence to such standards is said to 
be voluntary, meaning that participation is not mandated by state regulation. In 
this sense, such standards are “non-state driven.”5 Nevertheless, states – perhaps 
more so in Europe than in North America – have stimulated and supported their 
development and promulgation. Although some definitions of standards exclude 
firm-specific schemes, such as corporate codes of conduct,6 these are relevant to 
consider in an analysis of the trajectories of standard setting, as they are forms of 
private regulation that are proposed to address social and environmental issues.
Various institutional perspectives offer relevant starting points for address-
ing the multiplicity of standards by recognizing that standards are themselves 
institutions that (seek to) regulate economic behavior. Yet, standards – how they 
are formulated and the impact they may or may not have on economic behavior 
– are also the product of agency. This duality of structure and agency, of enabling 
3 Gilbert, Rasche, and Waddock (2011: p. 24).
4 Prakash and Potoski (2007).
5 Bernstein and Cashore (2007).
6 E.g., Brunsson, Rasche, and Seidl (2012).
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and constraining economic behavior, is the domain of institutional theorizing 
writ-large. Three different institutional perspectives have been used to explore 
the emergence of sustainability standards: an economic-institutional, an idealist-
institutional and a political-institutional perspective. Typically they have been 
considered as offering competing explanations.7 For example, why there are 
multiple standards in a particular sector in the first place, and how a multiplic-
ity of standards may continue to persist over time, might be puzzling from the 
economic and idealist-institutional perspectives, but not from a political-insti-
tutional perspective. Below, we first characterize these perspectives in general 
terms and then we extend their use by focusing on what they might have to say 
about the multiplicity of standards. Table 1 summarizes that discussion.
In general terms, institutional perspectives seek to explain the course 
of events by assuming that actors follow a particular kind of “action logic” in 
Table 1 Multiplicity of standards examined from three institutional perspectives.
  Economic 
institutional
  Idealist 
institutional
  Political  
institutional
Explanation of the 
Emergence of Standards
  Collective action 
problem to 
industry posed 
by consumer 
mobilization
  Articulation of 
social movement 
preferences
  Negotiated 
settlement that 
arises out of conflicts 
involving states, 
NGOs and firms
Expectation about the 
Persistence of Multiple 
Standards
  Somewhat likely, 
in the case 
where markets 
are strongly 
segmented, or for 
reasons of brand 
differentiation
  Unlikely, even 
if standards 
address different 
ideals, possible 
to the extent that 
they address 
different issues
  Likely, to the extent 
that material, 
cultural, or 
ideological interests 
remain irreconcilable
Pressure for Convergence 
or Reduction in the 
Number of Standards
  Strong, due to 
incentives for cost 
reduction and 
convergence of 
markets
  Strong, due to 
convergence of 
underlying norms
  Weak, due to 
divergence of 
material, cultural, or 
ideological interests
Examples   King and Lenox 
(2000); Reinecke, 
Manning and von 
Hagen (2012)
  Overdevest 
(2010); Scherer 
and Palazzo 
(2007); Rasche 
and Kell (2010)
  Fransen (2011); 
Bartley (2007)
7 cf. Bartley (2007); Bartley (2011); Fransen (2011).
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decision-making.8 For example, in the economic-institutional perspective, actors 
are depicted as economically rational beings – albeit restricted by a condition of 
incomplete information and bounded in their calculative abilities – that seek to 
gain a profit. Choice and decisions are made with an eye to the relative costs and 
benefits associated with various alternative courses of action. The action logic 
is one of “expected consequences,” expressed in economic terms. The idealist-
institutional perspective highlights a different action logic in decision-making, 
one that is based on “appropriateness,” i.e., on an evaluation of the current situ-
ation in relation to a normative perception of how the situation should be. Typi-
cally, actors follow rules if they feel that rules are legitimate; otherwise they may 
seek to change them. This perspective is “idealist” because it emphasizes how 
decision-making is informed by ideals. The third, political-institutional perspec-
tive shares the action logic of the economic-institutional perspective as based 
on expected consequences for oneself. However, rather than being universal in 
the sense that economic actors, ceteris paribus, informed by economic calculus 
would make the same choices, it is situational and contingent in the sense that 
what is perceived to be in one’s interest in a particular situation, and how one 
might pursue it, is informed by the history leading up to that situation and by the 
ways in which other actors have or are expected to make their choices.
2.1  Economic institutionalism
According to the economic-institutional perspective on the emergence of stand-
ards, “firms create certification systems to solve problems in the market – a view 
rooted in a conception of institutions as solutions to collective action problems.”9 
It has been argued that the mobilization of consumer concerns creates a collective 
action problem to firms in the industry related to reputation, information, and 
competition. Standards offers three solutions to this problem: they protect the 
reputations of firms in the industry from free-riders, especially if firm reputations 
depend on the reputation of the industry; they generate credible information 
about conditions in the extended supply chain, especially if the supply chains of 
firms are highly interconnected; and they help firms to maintain their competitive 
positions by preventing the undercutting of costs and by justifying price differen-
tials in the marketplace, especially when meeting consumer concerns is costly.10
8  March and Olsen (1989); Whelan et al. (2013).
9  Bartley (2007: p. 307).
10 Bartley (2007).
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Although this perspective is appealing to explain the emergence of stand-
ards per se, it is less evident how it might explain the emergence and persis-
tence of standards multiplicity. Multiple standards may emerge when a market 
is segmented in such a way that there are two or more clearly defined clusters 
of firms, each facing a unique collective action problem. Industry heterogeneity, 
e.g., in terms of customer demand and geography, leads one to expect that mul-
tiple standard setting initiatives are taken.11 For example, new standards might 
be developed in response to the particular concerns of various consumer groups, 
and hence a “partitioning” of the market into different segments might ensue 
that allows each of them to express their specific concerns as global citizens.12 
Yet such partitioned markets need not be stable, as competitive strategies, such 
as market development and differentiation, may increase competition among 
the multiple standards in the market.13 Dominant market players may enter the 
niches created around specific standards, and by increasing the market share of 
the standards they endorse, reduce the chances of survival for the others.14 Given 
that standards survive in a market if sufficient numbers of companies keep on 
endorsing them – depending ultimately on whether companies feel that continu-
ing the endorsement of a standard pays off by attracting sufficient demand in 
the marketplace – market forces may also result in the disappearance of some 
standards.
Further, multiplicity of standards may erode the very solution that standard 
setting offers. Standards multiplicity creates confusion for consumers and addi-
tional costs for producers. While the existence of a standard is a way for con-
sumers to gain information about the social and environmental performance 
of the company they are buying from, multiplicity of standards would seem to 
undermine this information, as consumers would no longer able to differenti-
ate and meaningfully choose between them.15 Producers – to the extent that they 
produce for different brands that have adopted different standards – may face 
the added cost of complying with multiple standards.16 Alternatively, they risk 
choosing standards that do not satisfy stakeholders and critics.17 Hence, there 
are pressures on producer firms, related to concerns about cost and demand, to 
reduce the number of standards. Yet, standards convergence might be difficult to 
11 Manning et al. (2012).
12 Cashore (2002); Micheletti (2003); McCaffrey and Kurland (2013).
13 Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen (2012).
14 Sikavica and Pozner (2013).
15 Mueller, Gomes dos Santos, and Seuring (2009); Jamali (2010).
16 Mutersbaugh (2005).
17 Turcotte, Bellefeuille, and den Hond (2007).
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achieve if the industry is characterized by complex horizontal and vertical power 
relations, or if vested organizational interests and sunk costs are high.18
From an economic-institutional perspective, it could be expected that there 
are some reasons for the existence of multiple standards in particular industries, 
but also that there are continuous incentives for standards convergence as well 
as competition between standards. This is likely to limit the number of standards 
that may thrive in a particular sector.
2.2  Idealist institutionalism
In the so-called “idealist institutional” perspective,19 standard setting is a nor-
mative attempt to structure markets by reducing and mitigating negative conse-
quences of profit maximization. Standards are intended to affect the valuation 
of entities – firms, products, services – in the market,20 and hence work through 
the market. They are based in social movements understood as “a set of opinions 
and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some ele-
ments of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”21 Once a 
firm adopts a standard, narratives are elaborated by both the firm and its critics. 
The tensions between these narratives – aspirational and assertive of good inten-
tions; critical in pointing out decoupling, inconsistencies, and hypocrisy – create 
a dynamic that “can put subtle yet effective pressure on [the firm] to adopt gradu-
ally the principles of its critics”22 as embodied in the standard. In this way, the 
adoption of a standard is likely to be consequential for the firm. Within a group of 
companies, an additional mechanism is proposed to be at play, based on reputa-
tional competition that is fed by transparency and comparison. For example, the 
firms that endorse the UN Global Compact are expected to annually publish their 
improvements along a set of 10 principles; thereby the UN Global Compact aims 
to create the conditions under which firms will find themselves obliged to work 
toward ever higher levels of social responsibility.23 In this perspective, standards 
are expressions of social movement preferences; they are performative because 
they change expectations.
18 Fransen (2011).
19 Fransen (2011).
20 Dubuisson-Quellier (2013).
21 McCarthy and Zald (1977: pp. 1217–1218).
22 Haack, Schoeneborn, and Wickert (2012: p. 822).
23 Rasche and Kell (2010).
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In different parts of the world, as well as in the same location, ideational 
preferences may vary. The diversity of preferences therefore explains the emer-
gence of multiple standards. However, following the “idealist institutional” logic, 
variation in the preferences, or norms, that underlie competing standards are 
likely to disappear over time as diffusion of ideas and social interaction across 
the communities that support the various standards result in the establishment 
of globally accepted minimum standards.24 In addition, it is expected that over 
time, minimum standards will become increasingly stringent, as stricter stand-
ards are better valued and preferred in the market over less stringent standards, 
in a process of “ratcheting-up.”25 If the least stringent standards fail to adjust their 
aspiration level upwards, they may disappear, because at some point in time they 
are no longer perceived to be credible. By implication, if the minimum level of 
acceptable norms rises over time, there is also an upward push on the more strin-
gent standards to raise their aspiration levels, because their legitimacy advantage 
is eroded by the rise of minimum level of acceptable norms. Therefore, it can be 
expected that, over time, private regulation through standard setting becomes 
more effective as both the less stringent standards converge to the aspiration 
levels of more stringent standards and the more stringent standards feel a push to 
aim for higher aspiration levels. This, in turn, may reduce barriers for collabora-
tion or even merger among standards. All in all, while the emergence of standards 
multiplicity can be explained in the idealist institutional perspective from initial 
variation in social movement preferences, it can be expected that over time the 
number of directly competing standards would slowly decrease.
2.3  Political institutionalism
This third perspective for understanding the emergence of standards views insti-
tutions as the outcome of political contestation.26 It starts from the notion that 
economic orders and their governance need to be perceived as legitimate. But 
legitimacy can be and is contested, as it is intertwined with practices, power, and 
material, cultural and ideological interests. Hence, standard setting is a means 
for affirming legitimacy as it mediates between practices and their justification.27 
Thus, standards “are not reducible to corporate strategies but rather reflect the 
negotiated settlements and institution-building projects that arise out of conflicts 
24 Meyer (2010).
25 Overdevest (2010).
26 Bartley (2007); Fransen (2011).
27 den Hond et al. (2007).
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involving states, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and other non-market 
actors, as well as firms.”28 According to this perspective, three factors shape the 
emergence of private standards. First, standard setting depends on the presence 
of institutional entrepreneurs – NGOs, states, firms – that seek to restore or chal-
lenge legitimacy, or to escape hegemonic definitions of sustainability as proposed 
by dominant actors. Second, it involves embedded and complex processes of con-
testation, negotiation and bargaining, in which different parties have diverging 
interests. For example, firms typically prefer weaker commitments with minimal 
enforcement, while NGOs prefer stronger, more binding standards. Third, stand-
ard setting is more likely to occur when the type of governance it represents – 
private, non-state driven regulation – is in itself seen as a legitimate means of 
governing some economic order.
Considering the focus of this perspective on struggles for legitimacy and 
interest-based strategizing, a multiplicity of standards is likely to reflect a diver-
gence of interests and inability to reach compromise on the material, cultural and 
ideological foundations of standards. For example, diversity in such interests 
between and among firms and NGOs would lead one to expect a greater level 
of standards multiplicity. Similarly, a lack of consensus between and among the 
parties involved about the issues at stake, leads one to expect a high degree of 
heterogeneity. Finally, the more the historical and current processes surrounding 
the establishment of the governance structure are characterized by conflict, the 
more heterogeneity should be expected.29
3  Standard setting in three sectors
In order to better understand what explains differences in standards multiplic-
ity in different sectors, we analyzed the dynamics of the emergence and evolu-
tion of multiple standards in the coffee, forestry and textile sectors. These sectors 
have been pioneering industries for the development of social and environmental 
standards, yet all show different trajectories in terms of standards multiplicity. 
The degree of multiplicity is low in the forest sector, average in the coffee sector, 
and high in the textile sector. Their relative maturity allows us to observe dynam-
ics over time. These sectors have received considerable attention from research-
ers, which allows us to base our analysis on previously published studies and 
documents to identify the set of social and environmental standards in these 
28 Bartley (2007: p. 399).
29 Fransen (2011).
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sectors. We differentiate standards by their year of creation, promoters and cri-
teria: which standards were created when and by whom? What is the context for 
standard setting? The remainder of this section recounts the dynamics of stand-
ard setting in the coffee, forestry and textile sectors.
3.1   Standards multiplicity in coffee: towards harmonization 
and collaboration
3.1.1  The structure and complexity of the value chain
Production in the coffee sector largely takes place in developing countries and 
is mainly exported to developed economies. Coffee production is highly frag-
mented: Two-thirds of coffee farmers are small-scale farmers. Large multina-
tional companies (such as Nestlé, Kraft Foods, and Sara Lee) and coffee roasters 
(such as Smucker’s, Strauss, Starbucks, and Tchibo), on the other hand, domi-
nate trade, resulting in a high concentration of buying power. The coffee trade 
is one of spot markets with long-term contracts. Small-scale farmers are largely 
price takers selling to middle-men. Increasingly, coffee is traded through direct 
sourcing by comparatively few, consolidated major coffee buyers.
3.1.2  Trigger for private regulation
Between 1963, when the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was founded 
under the auspices of the United Nations, and 1989, when the ICA was disman-
tled,30 coffee trade was regulated by a system of export quotas intended to protect 
coffee-growing-regions from significant price fluctuations. Since then, there 
has been a downward pressure on coffee prices and high price volatility, which 
shifted economic power from coffee growers to roasters.31 All this has created par-
ticular challenges for the livelihoods of small-scale producers. Additionally, the 
promotion of large-scale coffee plantations since the so-called “green revolution” 
in the 1970s, created environmental problems related to soil erosion, pesticide-
use, water management, and the destruction of wildlife habitats. In response to 
the liberalization of the coffee market and the encouragement of large-scale plan-
30 During the 1980s and under increasing pressure for market liberalization by the World Bank, 
the ICA gradually lost its legitimate role. Its members failed to re-negotiate the agreement in 
1989.
31 Petkova (2006).
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tations, a number of private initiatives emerged to address these issues. After a 
slow start, the market for certified sustainable coffee has grown by around 20% 
annually since 2000 (according to estimates, it reached 16% in 2009). In the Neth-
erlands, 40% of all coffee sold is certified and in the US it is 16%.32 The market for 
certified sustainable coffee has nevertheless remained fragmented (see Figure 1). 
At least eight major standards initiatives exist to date.
3.1.3  Pioneer standards: multiple NGO-led standards initiatives
Standards in the global coffee industry started with two parallel, rather inde-
pendent standards initiatives which emerged through coalitions of activists, con-
sumers and producers: Organic (established in 1972) and Fairtrade (established 
in 1989). The organic standard emerged from a coalition of activists fighting the 
increasing use of agro-chemicals and their harmful effects on the health of farmers 
and the environment. Fairtrade, by comparison, “resulted from a serendipitous 
convergence of different local initiatives in alternative commerce”33 who pursued 
a political agenda of empowering small-scale farmers in the Global South. It is 
a composite of movements including the co-operative movement, which aims 
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Figure 1 Evolution of certified coffee sales volumes.
Source: Updated from Reinecke, Manning, and von Hagen (2012). The data are from the stand-
ards organizations and were cross-checked with external publications.
32  < http://www.newforesight.com/sites/default/files/newforesight/TCC_CoffeeBarometer2012.
pdf > . Accessed August 2013.
33 Gendron, Bisaillon, and Otero Rance (2009: p. 64).
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to develop a co-operative economy, the charity trade movement which has a 
religious background, the solidarity trade movement which is more political in 
opposing capitalism and neo-imperialism, and the developmental trade move-
ment which is encouraged by international trade agencies and religious organiza-
tions to assist Southern producers.34
Independent from the Organic and Fairtrade initiatives, a group of biologists 
and environmental activists fighting the destruction of Latin America’s tropical 
rainforest established a conservation organization named the Rainforest Alli-
ance which launched a standard for coffee producers in 1995. Around the same 
time, biologists at the Smithsonian Migratory Bird Institute conducting ornitho-
logical field research in Latin America created the “bird-friendly” certification 
in 1996/1997 to protect the habitat of migratory birds. Both standards focused 
on environmental aspects, in particular the importance of shade-grown coffee 
production.
3.1.4  Follower standards: the coffee industry’s response
In response to fierce battles and campaigning by social movement activists and 
consumers against well-known coffee brands,35 sustainability became a concern 
to many mainstream operators. In the late 1990s, coffee companies started to 
adopt social-movement-driven standards to better market their brands. But they 
also developed their own codes of conduct and standards, such as UTZ Kapeh (co-
founded by the Ahold Coffee Company in 1997 and renamed UTZ Certified in 2007) 
and Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. Practices (in 2001), to address major incompatibilities with 
NGO-led standards. For example, NGO-led initiatives tend to favor small-scale 
producers who grow environmentally-friendly shade-grown coffee that preserves 
the natural habitat of tropical forests, yet many coffee roasters prefer to buy from 
large-scale plantations which do not fulfill the criteria of shade-grown coffee pro-
duction. In 2004, the 4C Association – the administrator of the Common Code for 
the Coffee Community (4C) – was established as a sector-spanning membership 
association. Although its members are business firms and trade associations in 
the coffee sector, it is managed through a multi-stakeholder governance board that 
includes one NGO. The initiative was heavily pushed by an agency of the German 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further company-driven 
initiatives include Nestlé’s Nespresso’s AAA Sustainable Quality Program (2005) 
and Illy’s Responsible Supply Chain Process standard (2011).
34 Low and Davenport (2005); Gendron, Bisaillon, and Otero Rance (2009).
35 Conroy (2007).
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3.1.5  Dynamics: increased harmonization and collaboration among standards
Because producers are typically driven to adopt multiple standards in order to 
satisfy different buyers, calls for harmonizing implementation systems emerged 
to reduce the high costs of multiple certifications. In an attempt to unify the sus-
tainability standards movement and give it credibility, the ISEAL Alliance was 
created (a meta-association and coalition of sustainability standards setters). 
ISEAL launched its “Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental 
Standards” in 2004. Among the 15 full members from various sectors at ISEAL, 
four are active in the coffee sector: two have been initiated by social movements – 
Fairtrade and Sustainable Agriculture Network – and two from the industry – UTZ 
and 4C. ISEAL plays an important role in turning competition into collaboration. 
For example, under the auspices of ISEAL in 2011, the three major coffee standards 
(Fairtrade, SAN/Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified) jointly declared that rather 
than competing, they “share the goal of transforming the world’s production 
systems.”36 These words were increasingly put into practice by developing collabo-
rative trainings, dual audits and dual certifications among these schemes. More-
over, 4C initially positioned its verification approach as an alternative to existing 
certifications. But its ambition to gain credibility as a full member of ISEAL Alli-
ance required 4C to justify the need for another standard in the coffee sector to 
ISEAL. 4C subsequently re-positioned itself as an entry standard that would fully 
collaborate with existing standards by providing a step-up to more stringent cer-
tification. While initially regarding 4C as a competitor, the fact that UTZ Certified, 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade have all joined ISEAL as members indicates 
how competitive relations were transformed into collaborative relations.
Despite increasing collaboration, strong ideological differences persist 
among standards promoters that prevent them from merging. One contentious 
issue is the treatment of small-scale farmers, which led to contestation within 
Fairtrade. In 2011, Fair Trade USA ended its membership with Fairtrade Interna-
tional (FLO) and launched an independent standard and certification system. The 
reason was that Fair Trade USA wanted to expand its standard to plantations and 
estates in coffee. FLO, in contrasts, has insisted on limiting certification to coffee 
co-operatives. This ideological divergence over which types of producers should 
be favored reflects the ongoing dynamics of the standards market and points to 
the likely continuation of multiple social movement-led standards.
Some firms have adopted double-standards rather than give up on their own 
standards. For instance, Starbucks and Nespresso maintain their own standards 
36 See  < http://sanstandards.org/sitio/nnews/display/10 > . Accessed 19 February 2011.
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in addition to endorsing Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance, respectively; fairtrade 
and organic are also a popular combination.
3.1.6  Summary
In the coffee sector, multiple activist groups emphasizing different social and envi-
ronmental issues pioneered multi-stakeholder standards. Standard setting was not 
an answer to a collective action problem in the industry. Rather, it was driven by the 
idiosyncratic goals and conceptions of sustainability of particular actors at particu-
lar times. Several dynamics are observed, including attempts at convergence – or 
perhaps better referred to as harmonization – among the social movement domi-
nated standards that are related to concerns for coffee growers’ cost levels, and 
repositioning of standards. Over time, the number of standards has grown, through 
the introduction of corporate specific codes and by the secession of Fair Trade USA.
3.2   Standards multiplicity in forestry: from national dualities 
to a global duopoly
3.2.1  The structure and complexity of the value chain
Forests cover about 4 billion hectares globally, 80% of which is under public 
ownership.37 More than half of the world’s forests are found in five countries: 
the Russian Federation, Brazil, Canada, US and China.38 The value chain in the 
timber industry includes nursery, planting, harvesting, mills, transportation, 
processing and distribution.39 Wood products and by-products include construc-
tion materials, furniture, paper and firewood. There are several types of organiza-
tions involved in the value chain: government departments, financial organisms, 
private companies and trade associations.40
3.2.2  A pioneer local standard: ATFS fighting fire and governmental policies
In 1941, in the US, the National Lumber Association (later renamed the National 
Forest Product Association) launched the “American Tree Farm System” (ATFS), 
37 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010).
38 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010).
39 Aoudji et al. (2012); Espinoza, Buehlmann, and Smith (2012).
40 Aoudji et al. (2012).
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a program designed to address “the twin threats of forest fires and government 
regulation of private forestlands,”41 Owners of private forest lands considered 
that the taxation system encouraged clear cutting rather than sylvicultural prac-
tice. Described as “the logical outgrowth of 50 years of agitation and propaganda 
for conservation,”42 the ATFS was popularized by powerful public relations cam-
paigns including ceremonies, barbecues and tree farm queens.43 It aligned public 
imagination with the aims of the conservationist movement, thereby “accom-
plishing a feat of indoctrination unparalleled in conservation history.”44
However, the ATFS was criticized right from its inception. The US Forest 
Service’s official voiced his suspicion that “the real object of this campaign is 
to ward off public regulation.”45 The program was initially focused on prevent-
ing fire losses by applying accepted fire protection techniques and ignoring 
other issues affecting the forestry sector including: soil erosion, conservation of 
wildlife and water supply protection. Furthermore, following a period of rapid 
expansion, some ATFS certified timberland owners were found to be not respect-
ing the standard. A few years after its creation, the ATFS tightened controls and 
expanded its emphasis from fire protection to sylvicultural practices. In 2012, 
more than 70 years after its creation, there were 27 million acres of ATFS certified 
forestland. It is an accredited certification body and it has been endorsed by the 
PEFC since 2008.46
3.2.3   Trigger for a global private regulation: failure to reach inter-
governmental agreement
In response to the pressing demands of environmental groups concerned with 
deforestation, in 1986, a group of tropical timber producing and consuming 
countries created the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) under 
the auspices of the United Nations to explore a proposal for a timber certifica-
tion. This proposal was rejected by the ITTO however.47 Other efforts to develop an 
international framework of agreements to prevent deforestation followed, such 
as the proposal for a binding forest convention.48 Despite the fact that it was on 
41 See  < http://foresthistory.org/About/fhshistory.html > . Accessed 20 March 2013.
42 Sharp (1949: p. 42).
43 17 million acres certified in 1949, Sharp (1949).
44 Sharp (1949: p. 44).
45 Sharp (1949: pp. 43–44).
46 See  < http://www.treefarmsystem.org > . Accessed 18 March 2013.
47 Meidinger (2006).
48 Cashore et al. (2007b).
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the agenda of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, countries were unable to agree on the content of what was to be the Global 
Forest Convention (an international framework agreement meant to prevent the 
deforestation and illegal logging of tropical timber).49 Later attempts at establish-
ing international framework agreements in forestry were equally unsuccessful, 
such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF, from 1995 to 1997), Intergov-
ernmental Forum on Forests (IFF, from 1997 to 2000) and United Nations Forum 
on Forests (UNFF, from 2000 to now). The failure to implement global forest man-
agement policies mainly stemmed from each country’s right to decide on how it 
planned on managing the exploitation of its natural resources and its national 
sovereignty.50
3.2.4  The FSC: a coordinated NGO-led standard initiative at the global level
To bypass setbacks in inter-governmental negotiations, the protagonists turned 
to the market and self-regulation. In 1989, the Rainforest Alliance created the 
“SmartWood” standard.51 Major environmental and social NGOs entered into an 
alliance with a number of forestry companies, retailers, governments, the World 
Bank and philanthropists. In 1993, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), together with 
other environmental NGOs and a few businesses (small scale producers and high-
end furniture manufacturers) from more than 25 countries created the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) – which was officially launched in 1994.52 The Interna-
tional Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement (IFOAM) was used as a blue-
print for this membership association.53 As a certifying organization for certifiers, 
the FSC was meant to accredit certification organizations such as SmartWood54 
and expanded from solely focusing on the protection of tropical forest timber to 
include the protection of temperate and boreal forests.55
The FSC has its critics including environmental groups such as FSC-Watch, 
that are concerned with the erosion of the FSC’s reliability and doubt its capacity 
to protect forests and biodiversity,56 and also, from the timber industry that found 
it too strict, costly and unpractical.
49 Meidinger (2006); Cashore et al. (2007b).
50 Cashore et al. (2007b).
51 Meidinger (2006).
52 Meidinger (2006).
53 Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009).
54 Meidinger (2006).
55 Cashore, Auld, and Newsom (2004).
56 Schepers (2010).
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3.2.5  Follower standards: the timber industry’s response
From the start, industry actors challenged the FSC. Its rigidity, high certification 
cost, lack of consideration for small producers and traditional forest practices, 
and its monopolistic pretentions, were criticized as trade barriers.57 Producers 
prioritized national sovereignty and forest management autonomy. This resulted 
in a number of country-level initiatives.58 In the US, the American Forest and 
Paper Association (AF&PA) implemented the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI, 
in 1994) “as a direct response to the creation of the FSC” and “to address the 
polarized atmosphere that had developed in the US over forestry issues.”59 Like-
wise, in Canada, members of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (renamed 
the Forest Products Association of Canada, in 2001) and various forest produc-
ers formed the Canadian Sustainable Forestry Certification Coalition, in 1994. 
In Europe, in 1999, forest owners and forest product corporations established 
their own program, the Pan European Forest Certification Council (PEFC). Other 
countries also began industry initiated certification organizations60 including 
the Brazilian Certification System (CERFLOR), Swiss Q-Label, Chilean Certifica-
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Figure 2 Evolution of the number of hectares of forest certified.
Source: Acreages were collected from certification organizations: FSC, SFI, CSA, PEFC, ATFS and 
others. These data were corroborated by comparing them to the data of the UN Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO), whose annual newsletters on the lumber industry include a chapter 
on forest certification; this prevents the double area calculation resulting from double certifica-
tion or mutual recognition. Calculation of a specific standard stops when it joins the PEFC.
57 See  < http://www.unece.org/forests/docs/rev-98/y-rev98.html > . Accessed August 2013.
58 Auld and Cashore (2012).
59 Cashore, Auld, and Newsom (2003: p. 232).
60 Auld, Gulbrandsen, and McDermott (2008).
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tion System (CERTFOR), UK Woodland Assurance Scheme (UKWAS), Malaysian 
Timber Certification Council (MTCC), Finnish Forest Certification System (FFCS), 
Australian Forestry Standard and Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI).
As shown in Figure 2, since the late 1990s, the area of certified forest has mul-
tiplied, from 1 million hectares in 1996 to 360 million hectares in 2010 (about 9% 
of the world’s forests).61 In part, this was the result of a strategic alliance between 
the World Bank and the WWF to have 6% of the world’s forests certified by 2005.62 
However, national certifiers have certified even larger areas, such as CSA and 
ISO in Canada, and SFI in the USA. Yet, certification remains concentrated in the 
northern hemisphere, with 58% of certified forests being in North America and 
33% in Europe.
3.2.6  Dynamics: the emergence of a duopoly
The PEFC, the SFI, the CSA and other national standards have been working on 
mutual certification recognitions. In 2004, the PEFC recognized the certification 
schemes of Australia and Chile, the first non-European countries to have their cri-
teria recognized. During that same year, the SFI in the US and the CSA in Canada 
became PEFC representatives in North America.
A second phase of harmonization began when the PEFC then changed its 
name and became the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification and 
worked on establishing itself as an umbrella organization for national certifi-
cation organizations. In 2000, the PEFC recognized certification systems in six 
European countries and in 2012, it recognized those of 30 countries63 including 
the American SFI (2005) and ATFS (2008) certifications, the Canadian CSA (2005) 
certification and almost all national certifications developed since 1993, as well 
as ISO 14001 and ISO 14061. Over the same period, the FSC recognized 18 national 
organizations and 36 national criteria schemes on the basis of their principles.64
Environmental NGOs were key stakeholders in stimulating demand for certi-
fied wood. As of the late 1980s, pressure from environmental NGOs on distribu-
tors and retailers contributed to the adoption of certification by brands and 
retailers. For instance, Home Depot in North America adopted the FSC; B&Q in 
61 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010).
62 See  < http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/0
9/24/000094946_02090604090781/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf > . Accessed August 2013.
63 See  < http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/Brochures/PEFC_Profile_2012.pdf > . 
Accessed August 2013.
64 See  < http://fsccanada.org/factsandfigures4.htm#FSCCanICstats > . Accessed 20 March 2011.
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Europe and superstores such as Staples and IKEA adopted procurement poli-
cies for certified products.65 In 2002, Time Inc., the editor of Time magazine and 
more than one hundred other magazines worldwide, set out to increase the use 
of paper stemming from certified forests from 25% to 80% in 2005.66 Public pro-
curement policies further contributed to this adoption. For example, the UK Gov-
ernment’s timber procurement policy requires that all timber and wood-derived 
products must be from legal and sustainable sources that are independently veri-
fied through FSC or PEFC certification. Similarly, the use of FSC-certified timber 
is a performance criterion of the LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design) construction certification of the US Green Building Council.
Environmental NGOs were also very active in defending what they perceived 
as the superiority of the FSC and encouraged other sustainability schemes to 
strengthen their criteria. The FSC is also a founding member of the ISEAL alli-
ance, an organization created in 2002 that, among other activities, established 
the credibility principles for sustainability standards.67 In 1999, responding to a 
claim that SFI scheme was equivalent to FSC, Home Depot ordered an independ-
ent study that concluded that FSC was superior to SFI (SFI then subsequently 
revised its program substantially).68 Later, the WWF and the World Bank have 
formed the Forest Alliance, which have published an analysis presenting the FSC 
as a superior standard compared with the PEFC.69 Swedish and Finnish studies 
came to the same conclusion and pushed the PEFC to meet the FSC standard.70
3.2.7  Summary
In forestry, private regulation began early on in the US, with an initiative by the 
industry’s small owners’ segment. Several decades later, a multi-stakeholder ini-
tiative with global ambitions was instigated by environmental NGOs. The FSC’s 
focus was initially on tropical timber but later increased its scope. This in turn, 
was followed by a range of national industry-led standards. After a period of frag-
mentation, industry-led standards consolidated their efforts which resulted in a 
duopoly between the industry-led PEFC and the NGO-led FSC. Both standards 
cover similar issues including a focus on environmental aspects, however, other 
65 Cashore et al. (2007a).
66 Tysiachniouk (2013).
67 See  < http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us/our-history > . Accessed 4 September 2013.
68 Overdevest (2010).
69 See  < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFORESTS/Resources/FCAG_WB_English.pdf > . 
Accessed August 2013.
70 Overdevest (2010).
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issues such as the health and safety of workers and community relationships are 
also important. To promote the adoption of FSC, activist groups pressured dis-
tributors and published information to discredit the PEFC.
3.3  Standards multiplicity in textile: a fragmented landscape
3.3.1  The structure and complexity of the value chain
In the textile sector, the development of global value chains, controlled by multi-
national brands and retailers, pushed supplier companies to become more flex-
ible in their operations: they had to meet short-term and rapidly shifting market 
demands regarding the quantity and quality of products while minimizing produc-
tion costs and delivery times. These are structural conditions that affect working 
conditions in their factories. The reputations of several brands and retailers in the 
industry were tarnished as activist groups and the media exposed the working 
conditions at their subcontractors’ production facilities in the USA and abroad 
(most notably in Latin America and South and South-East Asia). Standard-setting 
has been an important way for firms and activists to improve the working condi-
tions at subcontractors’ production facilities.
3.3.2  Trigger for private regulation
Standards on labor conditions date back to the 1970s when the OECD’s Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises were negotiated and accepted by national 
governments. In many countries, these principles were included in labor law, but 
often they were not enforced. When local labor unions – repressed as they have 
been in many countries and the special economic zones where production is con-
centrated – had little success in improving the workers’ labor conditions, interna-
tional labor union movements – such as the International Textile, Garment and 
Leather Worker’s Federation – as well as anti-sweatshop activist groups, started 
to put pressure on American textile companies to adopt more socially responsible 
business practices from the late 1980s onwards. Throughout, the ILO principles 
have become a major point of reference in the discussions about labor condi-
tions in the textile industry.71 In this context, standard setting has been a major 
approach to addressing the issues.72
71 Hassel (2008); Fransen (2011).
72 O’Rourke (2004).
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3.3.3  Pioneer standards: company code of conducts
Initially, codes of conduct were developed by single firms to guide their own 
practices as well as those of their partners, suppliers and subcontractors. In 
the early 1990s, corporations such as Levi’s, Nike, and Reebok, introduced their 
own corporate codes of conduct. By way of illustration, Nike reacted to negative 
media coverage by drafting and adopting a code of conduct (The Nike Code of 
Conduct) the same year that Levi’s introduced its code, which also applied to its 
suppliers. Yet again, the same year, in reaction to these initiatives, Reebok, Nike’s 
main competitor, developed its Human Rights Production Standard – a code very 
similar to that of Nike. However, these codes were not considered to be very effec-
tive. When attempts to develop binding labor standards in the GATT negotiations 
failed, both industry associations and multi-stakeholder initiatives started to 
develop standards in the mid-1990s; whereas the first of the former initiatives 
had little success – notably the Coalition of Apparel Industries in California – the 
latter were more successful.73
3.3.4   Follower standards: industry associations and multi-stakeholder 
initiatives
In May 1995, the Clothing Manufacturers’ Association of the US and the Amal-
gamated Clothing Textiles Workers’ Union signed a seminal agreement on the 
application of a code of conduct to be implemented on a national scale in com-
panies and among subcontractors. This code established minimum standards 
for wages, working hours, child labor, the right to associate, non-discrimination, 
and health and safety. Similarly, the American Apparel and Manufacturer Asso-
ciation, American Apparel and Footwear Association among other business asso-
ciations, created a code of conduct entitled WRAP, the Worldwide Responsible 
Apparel Production (introduced in 2000). The aim was to create an environment 
in which the US manufacturing industry could operate competitively within the 
globalized economy while establishing minimum standards for work conditions 
among suppliers and subcontractors. It claims to be the largest labor and envi-
ronmental certification program in manufacturing. This certification program 
focuses on the respect of local workplace laws.74
Given increasing doubts about the effectiveness of unilateral, self-enforced 
codes of conduct, the textile industry showed an increasing trend towards 
73 Bartley (2007)
74 See <http://www.wrapapparel.org/en/about-us>.
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multi-stakeholder standards that are applicable across multiple firms and moni-
tored by third-party certifiers. The first generation of multi-stakeholder standards 
was designed in partnership between activists groups and firms. They include the 
Fair Wear Foundation (FWF, Netherlands, established in 1995), Fair Labor Asso-
ciation (FLA, USA, established in 1995), Social Accountability International (SAI, 
American-European, established in 1996) and the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI, 
UK, established in 1996).
The creation of the Fair Labor Association (FLA), a network of companies, 
human rights and labor organizations, and colleges and universities, illustrates 
how political contestation among stakeholders may trigger the creation of counter 
standards. The FLA precursor was the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), 
which was funded by the US government and crafted by NGOs and companies.75 
However, lack of consensus among all participants led to the exit of organized 
labor and one NGO in particular became a fierce critic. Frustrated with the influ-
ence of businesses in the governance process, student activists and the American 
trade union representatives set up the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) in 1999 
with the aim of excluding firms from the standard’s governance and amplifying 
the voice of university representatives, labor experts, union representatives and 
NGOs.76
Similarly, the parallel creation of industry-led governance initiatives can be 
attributed to the division between firms and labor activist groups over govern-
ance and implementation procedures. Direct targeting of brand producers by 
activists creates a confrontational atmosphere between NGOs and firms, and can 
discourage some firms from adopting NGO-sponsored initiatives.77 Rather than 
settle conflicts conclusively or yield to the demands of activists, firms often find 
it more beneficial to sponsor their own, industry-controlled standards along-
side activist standards.78 Retailers’ frustration over activist attacks by the Clean 
Clothes Campaign (CCC), in negotiation over the creation of a joint Fair Wear 
Foundation (FWF) led them to refocus their efforts on private regulatory solu-
tions elsewhere.79 This not only encouraged firms to create their own standards, 
but influenced the future willingness of firms to cooperate with NGO-sponsored 
standards. Many firms subsequently left existing initiatives to create industry-led 
and controlled initiatives including the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Produc-
tion program (WRAP, USA, 2000) and the Business Social Compliance Initiative 
75 Bartley (2007: pp. 330–331).
76 O’Rourke (2004); Fransen (2011).
77 Sasser et al. (2006).
78 Fransen (2011).
79 Fransen (2012).
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(BSCI, pan-European, 2004). Turcotte and colleagues showed how, in a particular 
conflict in the textile sector, contestants strategically promoted specific stand-
ards.80 The contested company initially preferred an industry-led standard, while 
the activists felt that industry-led standards were lowering the bar and chose 
to pursue their campaign against the company until it adopted a socially-led 
standard.
3.3.5  Dynamics: attempts at harmonization and confrontation of two alliances
Firms and industry representatives have complained that the multiplicity of dif-
ferent schemes can create so-called “audit fatigue,” inefficiency, confusion about 
requirements, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, and higher costs for 
companies and their suppliers. In response, industry-led standards have begun 
to establish common platforms to harmonize the various, yet sometimes diver-
gent codes of conducts and monitoring systems. The BSCI, for example, presents 
itself as a harmonization effort in order to avoid audit duplications within the 
same factory. Similarly, the Global Social Compliance Program (GSCP), a cross-
industry platform for global retail, is a business driven program created “by and 
for global buying companies wanting to work collaboratively on improving the 
sustainability […] of their often-shared supply base.”81
Despite increasing collaboration, disagreement among private governance 
organizations prevails and it impedes the establishment of common labor stand-
ards.82 As a result, both social movement-led and industry-led standards persist. 
The example of the textile industry shows that the dynamics among private gov-
ernance organizations is largely based on strategic considerations; standards are 
developed as instruments to articulate to what extent and how labor conditions 
should be improved.
This analysis is further supported when we consider the fate of attempts 
at standards convergence. The Joint Initiative on Accountability and Workers’ 
Rights (JO-IN) was started in 2004, as an attempt by FLA, WRC, SAI, ETI, FWF 
and the CCC – i.e., standards supporters that are not dominated by business 
interests – to develop common standard for labor conditions and worker rights 
in the garment industry.83 This was to be achieved through a pilot project 
80 Turcotte, Bellefeuille, and den Hond (2007).
81 See  < http://www.gscpnet.com/ > . Accessed 30 October 2012.
82 Fransen (2011).
83 Fransen (2011).
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intended as a learning process. However, there are various reasons why JO-IN 
failed to realize its initial objectives: conflict among some of its partner organi-
zations, as well as successful attempts by BSCI to co-opt SAI at upgrading its 
own standards to SAI demands, and the emergence of further private initiatives 
specifically aimed at facilitating information exchange on the multiple audit 
efforts made at factories (SEDEX and GSCP).84 Despite its limited success, JO-IN 
indirectly led to two informal alliances among standards: one regrouping more 
business-controlled standards; the other regrouping standards that are more 
controlled by social movements as well as retail-focus firms. These two groups 
diverge on issues such as living wages, processes of auditing and monitoring, 
and procedural control. They converge on issues such as discrimination, forced 
labor and child labor.85
3.3.6  Summary
In the textile industry, social activists pressured brand companies through 
“naming and shaming” campaigns, to which corporations responded by advanc-
ing corporate codes of conduct. This was followed a few years later by multi-stake-
holder initiatives (MSIs) supported by activist groups and industry-led standards. 
Throughout this period, individual firms continued to develop their own codes 
of conduct. Disagreement over the governance of these MSIs – – influence was 
considered to be too substantial or not substantial enough – led to the creation 
of unilateral standards: BSCI and WRC. Failure to consolidate the MSI and social 
movement-led standards through the joint initiative JO-IN resulted in a landscape 
of multiple, largely overlapping, codes of conducts and multi-stakeholder stand-
ards that continue to be fragmented.
4   Analyzing the dynamics of variation in the  
multiplicity of standard setting
The trajectories of standard setting in these three sectors had different outcomes 
despite similarities in the initial standard setting conditions. Table 2 summarizes 
these observations.
84 Fransen (2011).
85 Fransen (2011).
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4.1  Similar starting points
The initial conditions for standard setting in these three sectors were quite similar. 
In all cases, global regulation to address social and environmental issues in these 
industries’ global value chains presented challenges.86 Under the influence of 
neo-liberal policies, global markets were liberalized and deregulated in the coffee 
Table 2 Similarities and differences between the three cases.
  Coffee   Textile   Forestry
Global regulatory 
context
  Break-down of the ICA 
and liberalization of 
coffee markets
  Failures to enforce 
intergovernmental 
agreements (ILO) 
and to create 
an international 
framework
  Failure to create 
an international/
UN framework 
to prevent 
deforestation
Industry structure   Concentration of 
power at retailer/
roaster/exporter level. 
Fragmentation at 
producer level
  Fragmentation at 
producer, retailer, 
and manufacturer 
level
  Majority of forest 
land under State 
ownership. Several 
large and many 
small logging 
companies. 
Large loggers are 
integrated into 
processing
Pioneers standard   NGOs, in multiple 
localized experiments
  Multiple single-firm 
codes of conducts
  National industry 
initiative in USA; 
isolated NGO 
standard; NGO-led 
MSI coalition
Follower standards   Industry actors introduce 
less strict codes of 
conducts as well as 
multi-stakeholder 
standards (4C)
  NGOs introduce 
stricter MSI 
based standards; 
emergence of 
industry-led 
standards (WRAP)
  Industry and 
governmental 
actors introduce 
less strict standards 
(SFI, PEFC)
Cooperation among 
standards
  Increased cooperation 
through ISEAL
  JO-IN attempts to 
consolidate failed
  Consolidation of 
multiple industry 
codes through PEFC
Level of standards 
multiplicity
  Partial consolidation 
(7–8 standards)
  Continued 
fragmentation ( > 20 
standards)
  Quasi-duopoly (FSC 
and PEFC)
86 cf. Vogel (2008).
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sector, which lead to the breakdown of the ICA in 1989. Despite several attempts 
to negotiate intergovernmental forestry agreements, countries failed to establish 
an internationally binding framework. Several issues in the textile sector were 
covered by ILO agreements, which however many countries failed to implement. 
In all three cases, there were significant transnational governance gaps.
These governance gaps were, in all three cases, a reason for activist groups 
and NGOs to challenge the legitimacy of the industry over several contentious 
issues. Private regulation initiatives emerged under their pressure. In the coffee 
sector, there was a rapid buildup of standards multiplicity in the late 1980s as 
various standard setting NGOs pursued diverging interests on the basis of dif-
ferent problem definitions. Yet, they struggled to gain market share. In the early 
1990s, textile companies such as Levi’s, Nike and Reebok were pioneers in adopt-
ing in-house corporate codes of conduct. Arguably, companies adopted them to 
neutralize criticism and to pre-empt NGOs from developing their industry stand-
ards. Here, multiplicity was the result of the most challenged companies seeking 
to defend their own positions in the marketplace versus competitors.87 Yet, they 
had little effect in shielding themselves from criticism. The forestry sector was 
also heavily criticized by NGOs. It might be argued that standard setting in the 
forestry sector was influenced by the experiences of the coffee and textile sectors 
– the NGO standards in coffee struggling to gain market share, and the corporate 
codes of conduct in textiles failing to convince their NGO critics – such that the 
various parties in the forestry sector sought to develop private regulation on a 
different, a multi-stakeholder model. The multi-stakeholder model is analogous 
in process to the technical and managerial standards that had been institutional-
ized for a long time in many industries, and it builds on the logic of government-
promoted industry self-regulation.88 It may therefore have been a way for NGOs to 
introduce their concerns within a well-known format for firms, and for firms, it 
was an opportunity to channel NGO criticism.
4.2  Comparable dynamics
In each of these cases, initial standard setting was followed by the introduction 
of more standards promoted by other actors. In the coffee sector, some companies 
adopted NGO standards but, significantly, companies introduced their own, less 
stringent, corporate standards. In the textile sector, when the initial corporate 
87 Some attempts in the mid-1990s in the US to develop a collective response by firms in the 
industry failed to take hold (Bartley 2007: p. 328).
88 Utting (2001).
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codes of conduct were ineffective in reducing social movement pressure, indus-
try standards as well as more stringent social movement standards were devel-
oped. In the forestry sector, following the apparent success of FSC, less stringent 
industry supported national standards were introduced in many countries. The 
number of standards increased in all cases.
The multiplication of standards does not only reflect variation in the issues 
addressed, but also variation in the level of stringency among standards that are 
overlapping in the issues addressed. Typically, industry-sponsored standards are 
easier to adopt and monitor than NGO and MSI standards, as the latter tend to 
insist on robust auditing mechanisms. Therefore, the introduction of industry-
sponsored standards, if successful, may increase the risk of a “race-to-the-bot-
tom.” The question of monitoring and auditing standards has thus come to the 
fore as a central concern that has been the subject of numerous controversies. 
In all three cases, NGOs have played a critical role in two respects. They were 
instrumental in driving demand for labeled and certified products by naming and 
shaming industry practices. And by challenging the legitimacy of industry-driven 
standards, they counteracted downward pressures and contributed to more strin-
gent industry-driven standards.
4.3  Different outcomes
Despite their similar starting points and comparable dynamics, the three cases 
followed different trajectories which resulted in different outcomes that affected 
the level of standards-multiplicity in each sector: the emergence of a quasi-
duopoly in forestry, a partial consolidation in coffee, and alliances but contin-
ued fragmentation in textiles. In each case, attempts were made to consolidate 
and harmonize standards, variously led by the industry, NGOs, or MSIs, and with 
diverging outcomes.
Several factors contributed to the convergence of standards in the forestry 
sector. The environmental movement coalesced behind the pioneering global 
forest standard FSC, thereby probably preventing the introduction of multiple 
NGO-led standards. Nation states and the forest industry reacted by propos-
ing national or regional standards. The fact that these industry standards had 
a specific geographical basis in their countries of origin may have facilitated 
collaboration and their mutual recognition under the PEFC label. This led to 
duopolistic competition between the FSC and PEFC. Most large global forest 
corporations buy from producers that are certified by either PEFC or FSC. While 
the protection of forested areas and biodiversity are the main concerns of these 
standards, they also address other issues including relationships with local 
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communities and First Nations, as well as workers’ safety; they are generalist 
standards.89
In the coffee sector, the first standards were specialist standards. However, 
concerns over the rising costs from endorsing multiple standards for small-scale 
coffee growers have created pressure to harmonize standards.90 Although the 
number of standards remained high – and with the secession of Fairtrade USA 
actually increased – the competition among multiple specialized standards has 
been transformed into collaboration through mutual adjustment and recogni-
tion, even if they have not converged into a common umbrella standard.
The most complex dynamics are observed in the textile sector. In comparison 
to the other two sectors, there is less agreement among the firms in the industry, 
nor among the social movements, about the modalities of standard setting. Some 
of the complexity is related to standards initiatives being geographically focused 
(North America versus Europe), some of it by disagreement among the NGOs about 
the role of firms in the governance of standards, and some by the responses of 
firms to social movement pressures. Industry collaboration – WRAP, BSCI, GSCP 
– has been more successful than collaboration among the NGO-led MSIs – JO-IN 
– and even able to co-opt some of the MSIs. Alliances have thus shifted.
5   Revisiting institutional explanations for 
standards multiplicity
As private regulation through standard setting has matured and multiple stand-
ards have developed, we were curious to see how multiplicity might evolve, and 
what might account for the variation in trajectories in the coffee, textile and 
forestry sectors. We compare the evidence from these sectors with the expecta-
tions from the three institutional perspectives, organized along the themes of 
initial standard setting activities, subsequent standard setting activities, and the 
number of standards (Table 3).
5.1  Initial standard setting activities
For a comparative discussion of initial standard setting activities across the three 
sectors, it is relevant to recapture the sequence of appearance and to consider both 
89 AFTS is an exception as it specializes in the management of forestry plantations.
90 The organic and bird-friendly standards were not part of this process.
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timing and proponents: in the coffee sector, the first standards were prepared in 
the early 1970s and in the late 1980; in the textile sector, it started around 1990; in 
the forestry sector – apart from the AFTS in the 1940s – standard setting initiatives 
that eventually became effective were prepared in the early 1990s. In each sector, 
different types of actors were involved in initial standard setting activities.
It was suggested from the economic-institutional perspective that standard 
setting is an industry-wide solution to a collective action problem that arises in 
the market. The ATFS standard may be a point in case. However, the evidence 
Table 3 Relevance of three institutional perspectives.
  Coffee   Textile   Forestry
Economic 
institutional
  Initial: n.a.
Subsequent: No 
organization of MSI 
because companies 
can organize their own 
supply
Multiplicity: High – costs 
of multiple standards are 
borne by weakest actors 
in value chain
  Initial: Company 
codes (collective 
action problem 
cannot be 
addressed 
collectively)
Subsequent: n.a.
Multiplicity: Highest 
– costs of multiple 
standards are borne 
by weakest actors 
in value chain
  Initial: ATFS as collective 
action solution for a 
segment of the industry
Subsequent: Creation of 
national industry standards 
(collective action response 
from industry)
Multiplicity: Low – national 
standards coalesce under 
PEFC as costs of multiple 
standards are borne by 
powerful actors in value 
chain
Idealist 
institutional
  Initial: Standards 
instigated by NGOs with 
different ideals
Subsequent: Some 
companies adopt NGO 
standards
Multiplicity: 
Harmonization efforts
  Initial: n.a.
Subsequent: 
Ambition levels 
increase among 
standards
Multiplicity: 
Harmonization 
efforts
  Initial: SmartWood 
instigated by NGO
Subsequent: NGOs coalesce 
behind FSC
Multiplicity: Harmonization 
among industry standards 
(PEFC)
Political 
institutional
  Initial: n.a.
Subsequent: Further 
standard setting 
activities by other 
parties; contestation 
among
NGOS
Multiplicity: High – 
sustained contestation 
among NGOs despite 
harmonization efforts
  Initial: n.a.
Subsequent: 
Further standard 
setting activities by 
other parties
Multiplicity: 
Highest – sustained 
contestation 
despite 
harmonization 
efforts
  Initial: FSC instigated as 
MSI
Subsequent: Further 
standard setting activities 
by other parties
Multiplicity: Continued 
contestation between FSC 
and PEFC
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from the coffee and textile sectors suggests that this is not a generalizable expla-
nation; standards were also introduced by NGOs (coffee, the NGO-led MSI in for-
estry) and by individual firms (coffee, textile).
In the idealist-institutional perspective standards are created as an articu-
lation of social movement preferences. In this perspective, a diversity of prefer-
ences would explain multiplicity of standards. This is clearly observed in the 
coffee sector, where multiple standard setting activities originated from NGOs 
advancing particular causes rooted in social movement preferences. In the for-
estry sector, the SmartWood standard, that was soon followed by the FSC, can be 
understood in this same light. Also, although it was instigated by social move-
ments’ organizations, the FSC was structured as a MSI, which is a governance 
structure that was promoted by social movements and that later became the 
norm. Subsequent standard setting in the coffee (4C) and textile (FLA) take this 
form. However, it is remarkable from the idealist-institutional perspective that 
there are hardly any other social-movement supported standard setting initia-
tives in the forestry sector, and also that initial standard setting activities in the 
textile sector did not come from NGOs.
In the political-institutional perspective, standard setting is a negotiation 
over the legitimacy of economic practices involving multiple parties: typically 
social movements challenge the industry legitimacy and the later attempt to 
restore it. Typically, therefore, standard setting takes the form of MSIs. One of the 
pioneer standards in forestry (FSC), as well as subsequent standard setting in the 
coffee (4C) and textile (FLA) take this form. The problem with this perspective is 
similar to that of the other two perspectives: it is not a generalizable explanation 
for all three cases.
How to make sense of this? We suggest that these three perspectives point out 
different reasons for initial standard setting activities, whose relevance is con-
tingent upon sector conditions and dynamics. Further, we suggest that they are 
interdependent in the sense that standard setting activities are not only driven 
by intra-sector conditions and dynamics, but also by inter-sector dynamics. For 
example, it might be the case that industry structure offers more or less oppor-
tunity for NGOs to mobilize producers for their standards.91 The fact that a large 
number of small coffee growers trade via middlemen on spot markets may have 
facilitated the organization of certified supply; such opportunities were absent 
in the forestry and textile sectors. Hence, whereas it seems to be the case that 
initial standard setting in the coffee sector can be explained from the idealist-
institutional perspective, it might not be just that. Idealist-institutional explana-
tions of standard setting may depend on the presence of particular conditions 
91 Schurman (2004).
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that facilitate the transformation of ideals into activities. Considering that stand-
ard setting activities in the coffee sector preceded those in the textile and forestry 
sectors, and that the idea of certified coffee and food was somewhat successful 
in gaining market share – albeit not to levels that their supporters would find 
satisfactory – the very possibility of social movement standards may well have 
been perceived as a threat in other sectors. Thus, in the textile sector – the next 
sector where standard setting was introduced – the economic-institutional per-
spective would become more relevant, yet not to the point that a collective action 
problem could be overcome, characterized as this sector is by highly complex 
value chains and high levels of competition in consumer markets.92 Here, indi-
vidual companies developed their own codes of conduct. This can be understood 
from the economic-institutional perspective, on the one hand as an attempt to 
pre-empt social movement standard setting, and on the other hand as a second 
best option given that a collective action solution was infeasible. Yet, these cor-
porate codes remained insufficiently credible. Next, and a few years later, stand-
ard setting in the forestry sector was premised on these dual experiences, and 
hence the conditions had come into place that would favor standard setting on 
the basis of a negotiated common solution among all interested parties. The polit-
ical-institutional explanation of standard setting may hence depend on the pres-
ence of conditions that stimulate parties to start negotiations and to be ready to 
accept compromises. Thus, the establishment of MSIs as governance structures 
for private regulation is not evident: the choice of an MSI as a governance struc-
ture for private regulation could only be made once experience had been gained 
with other types of standards. Moreover, in all three sectors public authorities 
were instrumental in the creation of MSIs, suggesting that participation in them 
may have required a bit of pressure.
5.2  Subsequent standard setting activities
In all three sectors, further standard setting activities are observed. In part, we 
argue, these can be explained by intra-sector dynamics, but the relative success 
of the initial MSI in the forestry sector eventually imposed this model of private 
regulation as the model to imitate. In turn, the greater say that NGOs obtained in 
the private regulation through their participation in MSIs invoked a sufficiently 
large threat for firms in the industry to eventually also develop a collective action 
solution – explained by the economic-institutional perspective.
92 Olson (2000).
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Subsequent standard setting in the coffee and textile sectors was done by the 
“other” party, as expected by the political-institutional perspective. In the coffee 
sector, in addition to some brands adopting NGO standards – as what would be 
expected and hoped for in the idealist-institutional perspective – they also devel-
oped company specific codes of conduct. Arguably, the explanation would par-
allel the reasons why firms in the textile industry started to introduce codes of 
conduct: the NGO standards posed a threat in the market, but not strong enough 
to overcome the collective action problem created by competition among the 
brands. What needs to be explained in the coffee sector is why it apparently took 
so long before the MSI type of standard setting was attempted,93 and why NGOs 
continued to introduce standards once the forestry MSI had become available. 
Perhaps it was precisely the feasibility of organizing their own supply, and hence 
a belief that there was no need for an MSI, that explains why MSIs remained 
absent in the coffee sector.
In the textile sector, NGOs were severely criticizing the corporate codes of 
conduct, yet unlike their counterparts in the coffee sector, they found little oppor-
tunity to organize a viable certified supply of “clean clothes.” Hence, once the 
MSI model in forestry became available, NGOs in the textile sector started to build 
on that model. A series of MSIs was introduced in the second half of the 1990s. 
Part of the multiplicity of MSI standards in the textile sector can be explained 
by geographical factors – some were concluded and operated within the North 
America, others in Europe – but for another part, it is a consequence of con-
flicts over the relative say and voice of NGOs versus firms in MSIs. For example, 
WRC was established out of dissatisfaction with the strength of industry voice 
in FLA, and industry interests coalesced in WRAP and BSCI. Interestingly, the 
precise governance structure of the various MSIs in the textile sector varies, but 
this is precisely what is to be expected from the political-institutional perspective. 
However, in the articulation of industry interests through WRAP and BSCI, the 
idealist-institutional argument that the ambition levels in standard setting would 
increase over time can also be observed.
In the forestry sector, the relative success of the FSC had two consequences 
for subsequent standard setting. First, it reduced the reasons for NGOs to look for 
alternative modes of standards setting. Second, it provided a reason for industry 
interests to seek a collective action, self-regulatory, solution, as expected from 
both the economic-institutional and the political-institutional perspectives. This 
occurred initially at the level of nation states, later on at the international level by 
the coalescing of national forestry standards under the PEFC umbrella.
93 ETI in the UK, 1998, was the first.
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5.3  Number of standards
In both the economic and idealist-institutional perspectives, it was expected that 
the number of standards would slowly reduce over time. Whereas a reduction in 
the numbers of standards per sector was not quite observed, there were attempts 
at convergence and harmonization of standards. In the case of the forestry sector 
this led to the emergence of a quasi-duopoly. Further, it can be argued that the 
conflict that is central to the political-institutional perspective may also lead 
to convergence and harmonization of standards, notably when compromise is 
reached, for example, as a means to reinforce the position of one MSI coalition 
vis-à-vis another MSI coalition by convincing actors, whether NGOs or firms, to 
join (forestry, but also BSCI/SAI in textile).
In the economic-institutional perspective, there would be continuing pres-
sures on the number of standards due to cost concerns and competitive position-
ing by firms. Three observations are in place. First, there is an association with 
the relative level of industry heterogeneity and the number of standards. Both are 
relatively higher in the textile sector than in the other two sectors. Yet, the prolif-
eration of standards in the textile sector seems to be more related to idealist and 
political institutional factors than to economic-institutional factors, as NGO-led 
MSIs are behind various standards, and new standards have been proposed in 
response to existing standards.
Second, competitive dynamics have apparently failed to eliminate standards 
from the market. In all sectors, niche standards have survived despite marginal 
trade volumes or support. Instead of competition as a driver for reducing the 
number of standards, we have seen attempts at establishing cooperation between 
standards and other forms of “meta-standardization”94 under the influence of 
public authorities. In the coffee sector, for example, German authorities were 
instrumental in the creation of 4C; in the forestry sector, convergence of national 
standards toward PEFC has been facilitated by the fact that national governments 
are the major owners of the land and have tight, long-term relationships with 
logging companies; in the textile sector, the Clinton administration was involved 
in creating FLA in an attempt to bring together the various industry and social 
movement actors that were fighting over the labor conditions in the industry. 
Such pushes for harmonization are unlikely to drive out standards; niche stand-
ards may increase legitimacy by associating with other standards.
Third, the cost of multiplicity was expected to play a role in reducing the 
number of standards. Apparently it did, but not in a straightforward manner. 
94 Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen (2012).
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Typically the costs associated by multiplicity of standards are born by the produc-
ers: suppliers in the textile sector, plantation owners in the coffee sector, logging 
firms in the forestry sectors. The cost pressures to reduce the numbers of stand-
ards appear to be ineffective when they can be pushed down the value chain to 
weaker parties (as in textile); when they are borne by more powerful actors (as 
in forestry), it is more likely that the number of standards is reduced. The coffee 
sector is an interesting in-between case, as the attempts by ISEAL to harmonize 
standards can be interpreted a recognition on the part of the standard setters of 
the difficulties that small-scale growers have in bearing the costs of compliance.
Despite growing cooperation among standards, the level of sustained con-
testation among standards setters and adopters remains high enough to account 
for the preservation of the identity of individual standards. Even if meta-organi-
zations such as ISEAL can promote harmonization and dissolve existing conflicts 
(as expected by the ideal-institutional perspective), deep-seated contestation on 
key issues is likely to sustain the co-existence of multiple standards (as expected 
by the political-institutional perspective). Resultantly, such efforts can also fail, 
as seen in the case of JO-IN. Contestation among social movement-led standards 
could also be seen as a form of “ideological” competition on a market for ideas for 
a sort of “moral authority.”95 This is not a purely commercial way of competing, 
but it explains why different social movement standards are equally in competi-
tion with each other, as the separation of Fair Trade USA from Fairtrade Interna-
tional (FLO) indicates.
6  Conclusion
Based on a cross-sector analysis of standard setting in the coffee, forestry and 
textile sectors, we find that competition among private standards, a multiplic-
ity of approaches, and fragmentation of initiatives are inherent parts of private 
regulatory regimes. Understanding the dynamics around standards multiplicity 
is therefore integral to understanding regulatory dynamics in the transnational 
governance field. This paper argues that there is no single dominant trajectory 
in the evolution of standards multiplicity in different sectors; rather governance 
arenas are shaped by a complex interplay of varying factors. Further, it argues 
that all three institutional perspectives on standard setting – economic-insti-
tutional, ideal-institutional and political-institutional – are relevant to under-
standing the dynamics around standards multiplicity. As the analysis above 
95 Shamir (2008).
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showed, each perspective could be and was productively invoked in explain-
ing episodes in the dynamics of standard setting in each of the three cases: at 
initial standard setting, in subsequent standard setting activities, and in sus-
taining the number of standards. Thus, claims about the supremacy of one per-
spective over another cannot be supported. Any claim about the validity of one 
perspective in explaining one episode of standard setting in one sector can be 
countered by pointing out a rival claim from another perspective on a similar 
episode in a different sector, and vice-versa. Neither do we believe that it is pos-
sible to specify under which conditions a particular perspective would be salient 
in explaining a particular episode of standard setting in some sector. Rather, 
we propose that each perspective reflects a different kind of “action logic” and 
that various action logics are simultaneously present and accessible to various 
parties involved – even if some parties may have a tendency to prefer one action 
logic over another. In this sense, they are complementary perspectives. This is 
one important insight that we developed by comparing standard setting in three 
different sectors.
Yet, how might they be complementary? We propose that standard setting 
– as an institutional practice – is performative but, at least in its early days, that 
it is also associated with uncertainties about its outcomes. Hence, it would trigger 
the articulation of various action logics – economic, idealist, and/or political 
institutional – in the context of a particular sector. Considerations of what would 
be appropriate or in one’s best interest – narrowly economic or broadly political 
– would be informed by sector-specific contingencies and experiences, as well 
as by the experiences from other sectors. This is a second important insight from 
our study.
By focusing on the multiplicity of standards in three sectors that by now 
have become relatively well-established, we had an opportunity to trace its 
dynamics. However, the standard setting in these sectors may have been 
shaped to a greater extent by institutional experimentation than in those in 
which standards were introduced more recently. While we suggest that cross-
sector learning has taken place among the sectors in this study, we expect that 
cross-sector learning and imitation may even be more prevalent in the dynam-
ics of standard setting in sectors such as cocoa, palm oil, sustainable building, 
or electronics. In these latter sectors, the dynamics of standard setting may be 
influenced even more by vicarious learning – facilitated by network contacts 
through ISEAL and similar meta-standardization initiatives – and mimetic 
isomorphism. It may thus be productive to investigate whether and how new 
sectors learn from, or are influenced by, standards trajectories in other sectors 
and to what extent this contributes to greater institutional alignment of private 
regulation.
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